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The City of Madrid is putting into operation Intermodal Exchange Stations (IESs) to 
make connections between urban and suburban transportation modes easier for users 
of public transport. We find that through the construction of an IES by a concessionaire 
it is indeed possible to arrive to solutions for the funding of urban transport 
infrastructure in which private profit and social benefit converge. Commuters save 
travel time and use better their transfer time. Bus companies diminish their costs of 
operation. The concessionaire receives revenues generated mainly by fees that urban 
buses (EMT), regional buses and interregional coaches—also privately operated—pay 
for using the IES, and by the commercial rents paid by shops and cafeterias inside the 
IES. The abutters gain in quality of life, society in general benefits from a reduction of 
emissions, and the government is able to promote these infrastructure facilities without 
recurring to its scarce budgetary resources. 
 
Keywords: Urban transportation, modal exchange, concessionaires, private and social 
savings. 
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Due to both urban sprawl and the growth of motorization ratios—Madrid has increased 
this ration by 20% in 10 years—a large number of cities in the world are experiencing 
an increasing use of the private cars. To curb this trend, many authorities are adopting 
measures to promote the use of public transportation. Those measures consist mostly 
in increasing the supply of public transportation through investing in new infrastructure, 
and improving the quality of service. However, budgetary constraints are often an 
important obstacle to these undertakings. 
The city of Madrid has been a pioneer in the last few years in the adoption of measures 
intended to promote public transportation use (Vassallo et al. 2009). One of the most 
important measures has been the construction of Intermodal Exchange Stations (IESs) 
to facilitate the links among different public transportation modes, particularly the 
connection of metropolitan bus services to the subway system. This paper describes 
and assesses a new and original practice, conducted by the Regional Government of 
Madrid, consisting of privately funding IESs through concession contracts with the 
private sector. 
The objective of this paper is to show, with the case study of IESs in Madrid, that it is 
possible to fund transport infrastructure in urban areas without public subsidies and all 
the stakeholders involved (users, transport operators, infrastructure concessionaires, 
abutters, and the government) ultimately gain. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section—after the introduction—
provides an overview of the characteristics of the IESs in the transportation system of 
the Madrid Metropolitan Area (MMA), and explains how the concession approach was 
introduced to fund IESs in Madrid with only private capital. The second section 
establishes a methodology to evaluate the social and private benefits on the different 
stakeholders stemming from the implementation of the IES. The third section provides 
an application of the methodology defined before to the case study of the Avenida de 
America IES. The fourth section contains the paper’s conclusions. 
The most interesting result of this paper is that the construction of IESs yields important 
social benefits to all the stakeholders involved so it may accurately be described as a 
win-win outcome. The commuters see how their travel times are reduced and their 
waiting times are better used; the bus companies diminish their operation costs; the 
abutters gain in quality of life by the urban regeneration projects; the community benefit 
from a reduction of the emissions; and the regional government is able to promote that 
without spending additional sums. 
WHY INTERMODAL EXCHANGE STATIONS IN MADRID’S 
METROPOLITAN AREA? 
Public Transport supply in MMA 
Six million inhabitants live in the Madrid Metropolitan Area (MMA), in an area of 8,000 
square km with an average population density of 7.42 inhabitants/hectare. The GDP 
per capita of the MMA is 30% above the average of the European Union. The MMA 
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used to be made up of a single compact center, Madrid City. However, in the last three 
decades, loosely connected conurbations have been expanding at a far more rapid rate 
than that of the population. Consequently, the population in the MMA has been 
relentlessly spreading out. The City Center still has a high population density, that 
decreases as one moves away to the municipalities on the periphery of the MMA. In 
the MMA the car ownership rate is almost 700 per 1,000 inhabitants, which is the 
highest motorization rate among the Spanish regions. The phenomenon of the 
suburbanization of both residence and employment along with the increase of car 
ownership is prompting new transportation trends in the MMA (Monzón et al. 2007). 
The mobility survey for the MMA shows that from 1996 to 2004 the number of 
mechanized trips increased by 52%, whereas the population increased only by 14% 
(Vassallo at al. 2009). It is worth noting how the relationships between the City Centre 
and the peripheral zones of the MMA are the only origin-destination pairs in the MMA 
where the public transportation market share has increased in the last eight years 
The public transport system in the MMA is made up of four modes. Two of them are the 
typical urban modes (subway and urban buses), and the other two are mostly 
metropolitan modes (commuter rail and metropolitan buses). The market share for 
each public transportation mode is: subway 40.6%, urban bus 29.5%, metropolitan bus 
17.3% and metropolitan railway 12.6%. 
A key element of the public transportation supply in the MMA is its integrated policy. 
The first level of integration is the institutional (Di Ciommo 2002). The integration of the 
different public authorities involved in the transport system was reached through the 
creation, in 1985, of a new public entity called “Consorcio Regional de Transportes de 
Madrid” (CRTM) aimed at coordinating metropolitan transportation policies in the MMA. 
The second level of integration took place in the fare structure. To this end, a monthly 
flat fare valid for all the public transport modes in the Region of Madrid was 
established. The third level of integration was the physical integration among transport 
modes. Since the creation of the CRTM, large infrastructure investments have been 
made to improve the physical connection among modes through the construction of 
intermodal exchange stations (IESs). These facilities have greatly contributed to 
improving coordination among the different transportation modes. 
What is an Intermodal Exchange Station? 
Madrid City Center is mostly connected to the suburbs through several radial highways 
which, once the boundaries defining the MMA have been crossed, continue to link 
Madrid with the main cities of Spain on the coast. Most of the metropolitan buses use 
these radial highways to bring commuters from the suburbs and satellite cities to the 
City Center. Once in Madrid City Center, most of the commuters take the metro system 
or the urban buses to get to their work.  
An Intermodal Exchange Station (IES) consists of a subterranean building, made up of 
several stories, that facilitates the modal transfer of commuters coming from the 
suburbs in metropolitan buses to both the subway and urban bus networks. Some IESs 
connect also to the commuter rail network, and some others are designed to receive 
interregional coaches as well. The IESs have escalators and elevators connecting the 
different floors. Moreover a set of signs are strategically located to guide the users. The 
IESs has some space available for transportation services, but also for shops and 
restaurants. Adjacent to this building an access tunnel or a segregated lane is built to 
help the buses to avoid the congestion in the access highways to the City Center. 
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Sometimes, the construction of an IES also may include the construction of 
underground multi-story public parking garages. 
Owing to this, it was decided to locate the IESs at the intersections of the radial 
highways with Madrid’s heaviest trafficked circular line (line 6) of the subway system. 
This is often the point where the first set of traffic lights is located and long lines of 
vehicles form during the peak hours. Some of the main criteria considered in planning 
the construction of particular IESs have been the following: its strategic location; the 
reduction of pedestrian connections between a mode of transport and another; the 
information systems implemented, especially travel and ticketing information 
(Grotenhuis et al. 2007); the security measures; the quality of the air and comfort inside 
of the IES; and finally, the supply of complementary services, such as shops and 
restaurants, that make the transfer time more pleasant for the commuters (Cristobal 
and Aldecoa 2002). 
The concession procedure to fund IESs in Madrid 
Many governments are facing increasing challenges to fund public transport 
infrastructure with scarce budgetary resources (Mayer 2007). To meet this funding gap, 
policy makers are turning to mechanisms aimed at involving the private sector in 
managing and financing new and existing infrastructure. Perhaps the most popular 
mechanism is the concession approach, which consists of transferring responsibility for 
construction, maintenance, and operation of the infrastructure to a private consortium, 
in exchange for a user fee that is valid a limited period of time, fixed or variable, but 
contractually agreed upon in advance (Vassallo and Gallego 2005). 
Spain has long experience in financing other kinds of infrastructure through concession 
contracts. The Spanish concession law is applicable to every type of public works, 
including the construction of IESs. The first IES in Madrid, Moncloa, built in 1995, was 
publicly funded. The success of this exchange station was noteworthy since the 
construction of a tunnel that avoided congestion in the access highway to Madrid City 
Center, along with a noticeable improvement in the connections among different public 
transport modes, led to an increase in demand for public transport in the corridor of 
more than 30% in only few years, which subsequently brought about a reduction in the 
use of the private car. 
Due to this success, the Regional Government of Madrid intended to undertake the 
construction of a new IES in Avenida de América, at the entrance to Madrid from the A-
2 highway, which experiences heavy traffic in the peak hours. However, at that time, 
the Regional Government of Madrid did not have enough budgetary resources 
available since costly plans for developing the subway network were just then being put 
into effect. Owing to this constraint, the Regional Government of Madrid decided to use 
the concession approach to fund this IES. 
The Regional Government of Madrid entrusted the CTRM with the preparation of the 
bidding terms and the subsequent contracts. Although the concession approach had a 
long tradition in Spain, this attempt was a real challenge for the CRTM for two reasons. 
First, the CRTM did not have any experience with infrastructure concession contracts, 
and second, the concession approach had never been used before to fund IESs in any 
city of the world. Regardless of this, in 1998 the CTRM launched the Avenida de 
America concession tender that was awarded in 2000. One of the requirements 
imposed by the CRTM to the bidders was the necessary implication of any coach 
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operator in the concession consortium to promote the use of the IES by interregional 
coaches since they were not obliged to use this infrastructure. The concession was 
awarded to a consortium made up of two big construction firms (ACS and Ferrovial), 
two private bus companies (Continental Auto and Trapsa), and one bank (Argentaria), 
which has been recently merged with BBVA. 
Table 1. Shareholders of the IESs consortium  
INTERMODAL STATIONS Shareholders of the consortium 
AVDA. AMERICA 
Bus Transport Co. 1              25.5% 
Bus Transport Co. 2              25.5% 
Construction Co. A              20.5% 
Construction Co. B              20.5% 
Bank                  5.0% 
Facility Management Co.     2.0% 
Consulting Co.      1.0% 
PLAZA DE CASTILLA 
Bus Transport Co. 1               34.0% 
Bus Transport Co. 2               22.0% 
Bus Transport Co. 3                 8.0% 
Bus Transport Co. 4                 8.0% 
Bus Transport Co. 5                 3.0% 
Construction Co.      20.0% 
Facility Management Co.       5.0% 
MONCLOA 
Bus Transport Co.                20.0% 
Construction Company     80.0% 
PRÍNCIPE PÍO 
Bus Transport Co. 1               30.0% 
Bus Transport Co. 2                 5.0% 
Construction Co.      55.0% 
Facility Management Co.    10.0% 
PLAZA ELÍPTICA 
Bus Transport Co.              20.00% 
Construction Co.    80.00% 
 
For several reasons, the experience with the Avenida de America proved successful. 
First, public transport usage in the corridor increased substantially within only a few 
years. And second, the Avenida of America IES was fully funded by the private sector 
without requiring any public subsidy. Owing to this success, the Regional Government 
of Madrid decided to undertake a master plan for the construction, maintenance and 
operation of several IESs during the period 2004-2007. This master plan underlies all 
three of the new IESs built in Madrid: Plaza Eliptica, Plaza de Castilla and Príncipe Pío, 
as well as the upgrade and expansion of the Moncloa IES whose first phase was built 
in 1995. Those IESs have recently started operation. Table 2 shows a summary of the 
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Table 2 – Main characteristics of the IESs in Madrid 












Capital Cost (million Euros) 26,6 120 36 50 97.2
Surface (square meters) 41,500 74,350 29,700 28,300 46,000
Access Tunnel (meters) 400 1,250 600 400 1,000
Demand (users/day) 445,400 269,300 126,300 299,200 360,000
Bus shelters 36 45 20 32 36
Number of lines 
(Metropolitan buses) 
14 37 14 13 35
Number of lines (Urban 
Buses) 
11 16 10 8 14
Number of lines (Metro) 4 3 2 3 2
Number of lines (Commuter 
Rail) 
0 0 0 2 0
Parking (number of spaces) 665 400  
Concession Term (years) 25 35 35 35 35
 
The Intermodal Exchange Stations have all been able to raise enough money so as to 
be funded solely by means of private capital through the concession approach. 
Consequently, the Regional Government of Madrid was able to promote this 
infrastructure without committing any additional budgetary resources. 
The revenues generated by the IESs are of several types. The most important source 
of revenue comes from the fees that metropolitan buses—which are operated by 
private companies—and urban buses—which are operated by the public company 
called EMT—have to pay to the concessionaire to use the IES. The fees for urban and 
metropolitan buses are to be paid by the bus operators to the concessionaire according 
to the number of passengers that get on and off each bus at the particular IES. 
Consequently, the greater the number of users, the larger will be the payment by the 
bus companies to the concessionaire. 
Although the fees paid by transportation operators are the most important revenue 
sources for the concessionaire, there are other revenue sources that contribute to fund 
the IESs. The most important ones are the commercial rents paid by shops and 
cafeterias inside the IES, the parking rents paid by cars when the IES includes a public 
parking area, and other revenues such as the rents obtained by advertising, vending 
machines and so on. In some cases these additional sources can be a very significant 
source of financing for the IESs. 
The share of the different revenue sources depends on the specific characteristics of 
each intermodal station. In the Avenida de America IES, 55% of the revenues are 
obtained from transport operators, 33% come from the commercial rents (shops, 
advertisements, vending machines and so on) and 12% from the parking area. 
However, in the Moncloa IES, 84% of the revenues come from transport operators and 
only 16% come from commercial rents. The commercial rents are the more variable 
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ones since they depend on the commercial potentiality of the IESs. As a rule of thumb, 
the CRTM establishes that the commercial rent per square meter is around €50 a 
month. The promotion of commercial activities prompts substantial advantages for the 
users. First, their stay in the IES becomes more pleasant. And second, they can take 
advantage of the waiting time to carry out other activities (DeSerpa, 1971; Mackie, Jara 
Díaz and Fowkes, 2001). 
 
SOCIAL AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF THE INTERMODAL 
EXCHANGE STATIONS 
In order to evaluate whether the implementation of IESs in Madrid constitutes an 
adequate urban transportation policy, it is necessary to assess the effects of the IESs 
on all the various stakeholders affected by them. We identify the following 
stakeholders: users, transportation operators, abutters and other citizens, IES 
concessionaires, and the government. Below, we analyze how the utility for each of the 
stakeholders change with the implementation of an IES. 
Effect on the Users 
Most of the users of the IESs are people who commute everyday from the suburbs of 
the MMA to Madrid City. To that end, they first take a metropolitan bus and once they 
have arrived in Madrid City, they transfer to the subway or to the urban buses. The 
IESs reduce the travel time of these users in four different ways. First, the access 
tunnel and the special bus lanes designed to segregate the buses from the regular 
traffic help the buses to avoid peak hour congestion, so travel times are reduced. 
Second, as travel times are reduced, additional use of public transportation is 
encouraged and, consequently, the bus frequency has to be raised to meet an ever-
rising demand. As a consequence of the higher frequency of buses, users reduce their 
waiting times at the bus stops. This fosters an even greater use of the metropolitan 
buses and the whole public transportation system (Jara-Diaz et al. 2008). Third, the 
modal transfer time for the users is reduced since, thanks to the IES, users do not have 
to cross any street and the signs available inside the IES facilitate the modal 
connection. Fourth, users can make use of the waiting time for other activities such as 
going shopping, which makes the transfer time more pleasant and useful. The time 
spent in the IES can be used to conduct some daily activities like buying food, or 
visiting the bank or post office. This way, the IES becomes a multi services platform 
where the waiting time can be usefully spent. 
The effect of a better use of the waiting time in the IES is linked to both the release of 
time, which can be used for other activities; and the disutility reduction linked to a more 
pleasant stay inside the IES. If users can utilize the waiting time for leisure activities, 
like shopping, their utility will be increased because the individual would reassign time 
from less to more valuable activities. Consequently, increasing the commercial 
activities inside the IES implies not only a rise of revenues for the concessionaire, but 
also a growth in the user utility, which means a social benefit. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the benefits that the construction of an IES produces in the 
commuters. The advantages described above improve the quality of the trip so the 
demand curve rises from Db to Da (the subscript b refers to the scenario before the 
IES and the subscript a refers to the scenario after IES). As the price p, that charged by 
the transportation companies to the users, remains the same before and after the 
construction of the IES, the benefit for the users (consumer surplus) will be given by 






 Figure 1. Benefits produced on the users for the construction of the IES 
This area is calculated according to the following equation: 










Db(q) Demand curve before the construction of the IES 
Da(q) Demand curve after the construction of the IES 
q Flow of passengers in the line 
p Price charged to the users 
qb Flow of passengers in the line before the construction of the IES 
qa Flow of passengers in the line after the construction of the IES 
Effects on public transport operators 
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There are several transportation operators affected by the construction of an IES: 
metropolitan buses, urban buses, commuter rail and the subway. The two most 
important transportation modes in an IES are the metropolitan bus companies and the 
subway, because most of the users transfer for one of these modes to the other. In this 
section, we focus first on the case of metropolitan buses, which is the mode that is 
most affected, and then we deal with the other transportation modes. 
Savings in travel time also implies important cost reductions for bus companies (Jara-
Diaz, 2007). The construction of the tunnel—beginning at a point of the access 
highway and debouching into the IES—enables metropolitan buses to realize 
significant time savings. This tunnel, adjacent to the IES, helps the buses to avoid the 
congestion caused by vehicles at the first set of traffic lights in entering the city. As a 
consequence, the operation costs of metropolitan bus companies are reduced because 
the travel time reduction means that fewer buses are required to provide the same 
frequency of bus service to meet a certain passenger demand. Fewer buses also mean 
fewer drivers. 
However, as has already been mentioned, it is expected that travel time savings will 
create a greater demand for use of metropolitan buses by consumers, so the frequency 
of such bus service will have to be increased. In this case, even though the average 
cost per user will be substantially reduced for reasons that will be discussed below, 
additional buses would be required to meet the higher demand, so total transport costs 
will not necessarily be reduced and they might even increase. 
Direct costs related to bus operation can be divided between  those costs depending 
on the kilometers effectively run by the fleet, and those costs depending on the 
operation time of the fleet (hours effectively driven). For instance, the wages of the 
drivers will depend on the number of hours they drive whereas the depreciation of the 
buses and the fuel consumptions will be related to the number of kilometers actually 
travelled by the bus fleet. 
The number of buses necessary to meet a certain demand of users is estimated 
according to the following equation: 
L
VS
qn 2⋅⋅=  (2) 
where: 
n Number of buses needed to serve a flow of passengers q 
q Flow of passengers in the line (passengers/hour) 
S Capacity of the buses (passengers/bus) 
V Average speed of the bus in the cycle route (Km/hour) 
2L Length of the cycle of the bus 
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The total cost of the bus operators per hour can be calculated according to equation 3: 
VncncaC ltT ⋅⋅+⋅+=  (3) 
where: 
CT Total cost per hour (€/hour) 
a Indirect costs (€/hour) 
ct Direct cost per time unit (€/hour×bus) 
cl Direct cost per length unit (€/km×bus) 
n Number of buses in the fleet 
V Average speed in the line (km/hour) 
 
Introducing equation 2 in equation 3 it is easy to obtain equation 4: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⋅⋅+= ltT cV
c
S
qLaC 2  (4) 
 
This equation shows how the total cost CT linearly increases with the flow of 
passengers q to be served by the bus company. However, for the same flow of 
passengers q, the higher the average speed in the line the lower will be the total cost. 
This is because the higher the average speed the smaller the fleet will be. For this 
reason, the CT curve—after the IES has been built—will be less steep than before. 
This effect is shown graphically in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Total cost of the bus operators before and after the construction of the IES 
From equation 3 is easy to estimate the average cost (ac) (see equation 5) and the 
marginal cost (mc) (see equation 6). The average cost (ac) decreases with q. The 
marginal cost (mc) is constant with q, but for a specific value of q it decreases with the 
average speed V. In other words, the increase of the average speed implies a greater 
efficiency of the bus company. 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣







Cac 2  (5) 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣





dCmc 2  (6) 
The surplus gained by the metropolitan bus companies if they had not been required to 
pay a fee for using the IES would be represented by the shaded area of Figure 3. The 
surplus can be easily calculated as ( ) ( ) ( )baabab qqmcpqmcmc −⋅−−⋅− . 
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Figure 3. Surplus for the bus operators before and after the construction of the IES 
However, the metropolitan buses have to pay to the IES an amount equal to the bus 
passengers who get on and off the bus at the IES multiplied by the IES fee. The 
surplus or benefit of the metropolitan bus companies BO is consequently calculated 
according to equation 7. 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] wqqqmcpqmcmcB abaababO ⋅−−⋅−−⋅−=  (7) 
The term w is the fee per passenger that the bus companies have to pay to the IES 
concessionaire. The CRTM has required metropolitan bus companies to pay this fee 
without increasing the fares they charge to the users, so the value of w should allow 
BO to be always positive. 
In other words, the operation costs saved by the bus companies should be higher than 
the amounts those companies pay to the concessionaire. This is the key to explaining 
how the IESs are funded. The operation cost savings to the metropolitan bus 
companies throughout the life of the concession enable those companies, through the 
sums they then transfer to the IES, to help pay off the debt incurred by the 
shareholders of IES. In other words, the belief in such a future revenue stream is what 
initial investors, those who build and maintain the IES, take into account in their original 
calculations. 
Until now, we have focused our analysis on the metropolitan buses. Let us deal with 
the rest of the transportation modes. The urban buses, which are operated by a single 
public municipal company called EMT, are not as important for the IES as the 
metropolitan ones, since fewer urban lines go all the way to the IESs. Some of the 
urban bus lines that connect directly to one of the IES transportation nodes, also use 
the access tunnel so they save travel time just as do the metropolitan lines, but other 
lines, the ones that do not use the access tunnel, do not necessarily save travel time. 
Like the metropolitan buses, the ultimate benefit for the EMT will depend on the 
savings in operation costs, the additional revenues collected by the EMT that are a 
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result of the better quality of service and better connections with other transportation 
modes, and the fee that the EMT has to pay to the IES concessionaire. 
Other transportation modes—such as the subway and the commuter rail—are less 
affected by the construction of the IES because their costs of operation are not reduced 
by the existence of the IES. However, they can observe that their ridership increases, 
for the existence of the IES makes transfers to and from them easier, and thus 
provides them with additional users. Moreover, the metro and the commuter rail do not 
pay any fee to the IES, and their utility appears at least not to diminish, but it would be 
more sensible to assume that the additional patronage likely to result from the IES will 
increase the utility of these lines. 
Effects on the abutters and other citizens 
The abutters and other citizens are also increasing their utility since they are benefiting 
from a better quality of life. The IESs reduce the space occupied by urban metropolitan 
buses that, before the existence of the IES, used to stop on the street to leave off 
passengers. Those buses on the street reduced the capacity of the urban road 
network, made difficult the transit of the pedestrians, and caused deterioration in the 
image of the area and in property values. The construction of the IESs left plenty of 
available space on the ground, which, now more attractively built up, has substantially 
improved the image of the urban area around the IES, thus greatly benefited the 
abutters and other citizens. 
Although no specific study has been conducted to estimate the influence of the IES on 
the prices of real estate around the IESs, it is expected that those prices will increase, 
which undoubtedly would benefit the abutters. Di Ciommo (2003) reported that the 
construction of the Intermodal Station of the Gare du Nord in Paris prompted rent 
increases in the nearest apartments of around 40% to 50%. However, as it already 
happened at the Gare du Nord, this effect can accelerate a process of gentrification of 
the urban area, pushing out the low income abutters to other neighborhoods. 
Moreover, as some authors point out, the time saved by the users means both a 
private benefit for the users and a social benefit for the community (Crozet and Joly 
2004; Mackie et al. 2001; Hine and Scott 2000). For instance, the construction of the 
IES and its adjacent tunnel brings about important environmental benefits as well. First, 
as the use of buses in the corridor increases, the use of private cars will diminish. This 
will prompt a reduction of emissions and congestion costs that benefits the abutters 
and other citizens. Second, regardless of the modal market share, the reduction of 
congestion will prompt a reduction of emissions and energy consumption. And third, 
after the construction of the IES, the urban environment in the area where the buses 
used to stop in order to leave off the passengers will be substantially improved. 
Effects on the IES concessionaire and the government 
The IES concession is designed so as to make the IES business self-financing for the 
private sector without any need for public support. The condition set up in equation 8 
has to be met for this to happen: 
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00 )1()1( αα  (8) 
Where: 
AR Additional revenues (shop rents, advertisements, and so on) 
Qai Annual bus passengers in year i = qai×(hours of operation year i)  
wi Fee per passenger to be paid to the IES concessionaire 
α Weighted average cost of capital 
Ii Investment or capital cost in year i 
MOi Maintenance and Operation Cost y year i 
Ti Income taxes paid by the IES in year i 
 
The IES concessionaire is supposed to make some profit. Obviously, no entity would 
ever have bid for the concession in the first place unless it had reasonably calculated a 
future a benefit would be derived from the awarding of that concession. According to 
the concession contract terms, the concessionaire takes on many risks, such as 
construction, operation and demand risk. Consequently, the profits that the 
concessionaire ultimately obtains will depend on how the business goes on in the 
future. The ultimate utility of the concessionaire will depend on the revenues it will 
obtain from both transportation operators, commercial rent and other sources ( parking 
rents, for example), and the ultimate construction and operation costs of the IES 
Regarding the regional government, its role is not to make money for itself but rather to 
increase benefits for the whole community. However, the government often has 
important budgetary constraints, so it is important for it to be able to promote 
infrastructure investment without affecting the public budget. In the case of the IESs, 
the government itself does not provide any subsidy to the concessionaire, but it still 
holds some of the concession risks such as force majeure or the risk of political 
changes that can prompt legislative modifications of the existing legal framework. In 
spite of this, the government will still obtain resources through the additional corporate 
tax revenues that will likely be paid by the IES Company. 
THE AVENIDA DE AMERICA CASE STUDY 
In this section, we conduct an exercise intended to evaluate, according to the 
methodology outlined before, the case study of the Avenida de America IES. This IES 
entered into operation in 2000 so there is enough of a track record to enable us to 
quantify the costs and benefits derived from its being put into operation. 
The CRTM (2007) reported that the construction of the Avenida de América IESs and 
their adjacent tunnels and segregated lanes enabled metropolitan buses to save 10 
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minutes per trip, which means an average travel time reduction of 39% compared to 
the pre-IES situation. This savings in travel time resulted in additional demand. In fact, 
the CTRM (2007) reported an increased demand (as measured in number of bus 
passengers) of around 22%. 
First, we conducted an analysis of the users’ benefits caused by travel time savings. 
According to a survey based on revealed preferences, an average travel time value of 
8.8 Euros/hour for bus users can be adopted (CRTM 2007). In order to simplify the 
analysis, we considered that the only benefit for the bus users are travel time savings. 
Applying equation 1 to the case study of Avenida de América in order to calculate the 
yearly benefits, and discounting the benefits at the social discount rate used in Spain, 
we obtained a result that gave, as the discounted value of accumulated benefits 
accounts 1,042.65 million Euros. 
After that, we evaluated whether the operation cost reduction compensates for the fee 
that the bus companies have to pay to the IES concessionaire. According to equation 
5, we can calculate the marginal cost reduction caused by the increase in the average 
speed of bus travel. Introducing the average characteristics of the bus lines getting to 
Avenida de América in equation 5, and assuming that the hourly salary for bus drivers 
is 17 Euros/hour (Ministerio de Fomento 2006) we can easily calculate that the 
marginal cost reduction per passenger comes to 0.16 Euros/passenger, which is 
substantially higher than the fee of 0.06 Euros/passenger that the bus companies have 
to pay to the IES concessionaire. 
This means that, for the Avenida the América IES, the bus companies can largely 
cover the additional fee they have to pay to use the IESs without a surcharge added to 
the user tickets. In fact, in the new IESs, the fees established have been set at around 
0.15 Euros/passenger, which are much closer to the marginal cost reduction. Overall, 
for the Avenida de América IES we have estimated savings in operation costs which, 
once discounted, amount to around 73.76 million Euros for the life of the concession. 
Table 3 shows a balance of the quantifiable costs and benefits produced with the 
construction of the Avenida de America IES. The left side of Table 3 displays the 
quantifiable social costs derived from the construction and operation of the IES 
(construction, maintenance and operation costs of the IES) compared to the alternative 
of having no IES. On the right side are shown the quantifiable social benefits. The 
figures in the table are actually discounted to present value. It is noteworthy that the 
social benefits are much higher than the costs. This is because the IES produces 
important benefits to the users in terms of travel time savings and a better use of 
waiting time while most of the resources to fund the IES come from savings in 
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Table 3. Discounted costs and benefits stemming from the construction of the Avenida de América IES in 
Madrid 
COSTS Euros Euros BENFITS 
Capital cost for the 
construction of the IES 
25,620,000 73,761,568
Reduction of operation costs 
of metropolitan buses 
Maintenance and Operation 
Costs 
48,207,168 66,977,681
Additional revenues (parking, 
shop rents, advertising and 
so on) 
Other costs 1,000,000 1,042,651,201
Travel time saved by the 
users and waiting time 
reallocation 
TOTAL COSTS 74,827,168 1,183,390,450 TOTAL BENEFITS 
 
The analysis conducted previously is very conservative since many benefits have not 
been quantified. For instance, the reduction of emissions and energy consumption 
caused by the reduction of congestion has not been taken into account, and this is 
clearly a major benefit that will only grow in importance. Moreover, we have not 
included in this analysis the benefits to the abutters such as the improvement of the 
urban environment in the areas where the buses used to be parked. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The implementation of IES concessions in Madrid can be deemed a real success for 
several reasons. First, these facilities have encouraged the use of public transportation 
in Madrid with the subsequent reduction of congestion and other non-monetized 
externalities. Second, the IESs have contributed to the reduction of the operation costs 
of the metropolitan buses. Third, the IESs have improved the urban environment in 
areas of the city center that used to be subject to steady deterioration. And fourth, 
these infrastructure facilities have been able to raise enough money so as to be funded 
solely by means of private capital through the PPP approach. Consequently, the 
government was able to promote this infrastructure without committing any additional 
budgetary resources. 
The IESs were able to be funded only with private capital because it was expected that 
the IESs would be able to raise the necessary revenues to cover their costs. The 
revenues come from two sources: the fees paid by the buses getting at the IES, and 
other additional revenues (shop rents, parking rents, advertisements, vending 
machines, and so on). The fees paid by the metropolitan buses are lower than the 
operation costs they save by using the IESs so the bus companies do not need to raise 
the fares they charge to the commuters. Moreover, the advantages of the IES for the 
users in terms of reduction in travel time, increased comfort, and better connections to 
other urban transportation modes fosters a greater usage of the IES, which in turn 
increases the value of the commercial activities inside the IES. The second key issue in 
raising money consists in taking advantage of the creation of an area where many 
people gather, or pass through, every day, and thus commercial revenues from stores 
on-site can be substantial. In particular the new commercial activities can increase 
strongly the user utility and release their time constraint. In addition, some IESs offer 
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public parking, for payment, from which revenues are raised to fund the infrastructure 
as well. 
The construction of the IES is thus a very good example of a win-win strategy. The 
users are pleased since they save time without paying a larger fare for using the 
metropolitan buses. The bus companies are also happy since, even though they have 
to now pay a fee to the IES concessionaire, this amount is smaller than the 
transportation costs they save. Moreover, the bus companies are also pleased since 
the usage of buses has substantially increased since the construction of the IES. The 
concessionaire is pleased as well since she has a good business opportunity. The 
abutters gain in quality of life. The community, even the country, benefits from a 
reduction in emissions. And the government is able to promote all that without 
spending additional sums. 
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